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ABSTRACT Securing digital evidence is a key factor that contributes to evidence admissibility during
digital forensic investigations, particularly in establishing the chain of custody of digital evidence.
However, not enough is done to ensure that the environment and access to the evidence are secure.
Attackers can go to extreme lengths to cover up their tracks, which is a serious concern to digital forensics
– particularly digital forensic readiness. If an attacker gains access to the location where evidence is stored,
they could easily alter the evidence (if not remove it altogether). Even though integrity checks can be
performed to ensure that the evidence is sound, the collected evidence may contain sensitive information
that an attacker can easily use for other forms of attack. To this end, this paper proposes a model for
securely storing digital evidence captured pre- and post-incident to achieve reactive forensics. Various
components were considered, such as integrity checks, environment sandboxing, strong encryption, twofactor authentication, as well as unique random file naming. A proof-of-concept tool was developed to
realize this model and to prove its validity. A series of tests were conducted to check for system security,
performance, and requirements validation, Overall, the results obtained showed that, with minimal effort,
securing forensic artefacts is a relatively inexpensive and reliable feat. This paper aims to standardize
evidence storage, practice high security standards, as well as remove the need to create new systems that
achieve the same purpose.
INDEX TERMS Digital Forensic Readiness; Secure Storage; Integrity Verification; Encryption, Digital
Forensic Soundness

I.

INTRODUCTION

The upsurge in cyber-attacks and data exploitation has
made the need for digital investigations paramount [1]–[3].
Standardization and adherence to best practices have
become essential to ensure the least amount of human error
causing inadmissible evidence [4], [5]. Forensic artefacts
are very important when it comes to investigation and
litigation, as they provide the details of an incident [6], [7].
When forensic artefacts are presented in a court of law, they
are subject to scrutiny and require verification and crossexamination [8], [9]. Digital evidence needs to preserve the
CIA triad [10], namely confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Confidentiality of digital evidence must be
ensured because the evidence may contain sensitive
information such as credit card information or other
personal identifiers [10]. To protect the evidence, strict
access control needs to be maintained, and/or an encryption
scheme has to be used to ensure that only an investigator or
authorized parties have access to the digital evidence [11].

Ensuring the integrity of the digital evidence is one of the
most important processes of any digital investigation, as an
investigator needs to prove that the evidence was not
fabricated or tampered with in any way. To achieve this, a
forensic copy of the original evidence, as well as the
software logs and the chain of custody, is kept [12]. The
process followed by the investigator to acquire the evidence
also needs to be documented. The forensic hash of the
evidence needs to be calculated at different times – during
the time of collection and storage – to ensure that the
original evidence was not changed, and the process
followed by the investigator was sound and did not modify
the evidence in any way. Therefore, a secure storage model
is needed to improve the investigation process and
safeguard any sensitive information collected. The same
problem affects digital forensic readiness systems, whether
large or small organizations or even individual people.
These systems collect evidence proactively, therefore,
evidence preservation and storage processes are vital to
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ensure that evidence is valid and authentic.
The next section provides some background on digital
forensic readiness and encryption. Thereafter, the proposed
process model is explained, detailing each of the processes
involved, followed by the proof-of-concept prototype tool
that was developed. Next, the tool was evaluated in terms
of usefulness and performance, before the paper is
concluded.
II.

BACKGROUND

Digital forensic readiness (DFR) as defined by Tan [13] is
the ability of an organization to maximize its evidence
collection mechanisms whilst aiming to reduce the costs
involved in collection [13]. Therefore, to achieve DFR,
potential digital evidence collection needs to take place
before an incident can occur. DFR is a proactive approach to
digital forensics that is more robust and cost-effective in the
long term. To implement DFR in any organization, its
business operations need to be well defined and understood,
as they may differ from organization to organization. The
ISO/IEC 27043 international standard [14] defines a more
robust guideline about the traditional digital investigation
processes as well as high-level readiness processes. This
encompasses five processes, namely readiness, initialization,
acquisition, investigative, and concurrent processes [14]. It
also ties in with the investigation lifecycle as shown in Figure
1, which consists of planning, acquisition, preservation,
analysis, reporting, dissemination, and chain of custody.
Most research focuses on the acquisition and analysis of
evidence; however, little is done about the preservation of
evidence and its integrity. No comprehensive models or
guidelines are defined for evidence integrity preservation,
specifically in digital forensic readiness. Although ISO/IEC
27037 [15] contains a clause on evidence preservation that
outlines general guidelines on the physical storage and
preservation of evidence, it is not sufficient for
comprehensive evidence integrity preservation in terms of
storage security.

Figure 1. Investigation Lifecycle

Most existing research focuses on using encryption to
secure data that is being stored [16]–[19]. Due to the nature
of the data stored, most common encryption focuses on
symmetric encryption which means that there is a single
encryption key that also serves as the decryption key [11],
[20]. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is the dominant
(standard) encryption scheme used by cloud and enterprise
platforms because of its speed and performance [11], [20],

[21]. However, if the decryption key is not stored securely, it
leaves the encrypted data still vulnerable to be stolen or
misused. At the time of writing this paper, no model or
framework provides the best practice on how to securely
store data and ensure its integrity in a digital forensic
environment. In digital forensics, it is essential that the
integrity of the data remains intact to make it reputable and
admissible in a court of law [22], [23]. In DFR, potential
digital evidence (PDE) is defined as information or data
stored or transmitted in binary form, which has not yet been
determined to be relevant to the investigation (through the
process of examination and analysis) [14]. Only after the
PDE has been positively identified as evidence, it is accepted
as digital evidence. To mimic a more real-world application
of PDE with DFR in mind all references to PDE are made to
simplify the explanations. PDE can be seen as small artefacts
(not large disk dumps) that may hold important or sensitive
data. Since PDE could be used to incriminate an individual, it
needs to maintain its integrity and authenticity to be
admissible. Therefore, some processes must be in place to
ensure the correct steps and processes are followed, to ensure
the integrity of the PDE. To date, no processes or models
exist to address the integrity constraint, especially with DFR.
There are also no tools that focus solely on the storage of
PDE. On the contrary, these tools focus on the extraction and
collection of PDE, and it is up to the investigator or
organization to safeguard and preserve the PDE according to
their policies [24].
Anti-forensics is cumbersome in cloud environments, and
attackers are always trying to cover up their footprints [25].
They usually move laterally in a network to find
vulnerabilities and exploit them by removing any traces of
the attack from the logs and computers. Therefore, having a
secure environment is important, and sensitive information
should be secured and encrypted. While several cloud service
providers do provide encryption, it often comes at a huge
cost or additional overhead and attackers can easily bypass
the service providers’ countermeasures by targeting less
secure Virtual Machines (VMs) [25]. While several studies
have explored readiness in the cloud [15], [26]–[28], the
more fundamental problem is providing secure storage for
the PDE artifacts that are collected. To that end, this research
developed a secure storage system to store digitally forensic
ready PDE artifacts in a forensically sound manner. The next
section explains the developed process model, namely Secure
Readiness Storage (SecureRS), in accordance with security
standards and the digital forensic investigation lifecycle.

III.

SecureRS PROCESS MODEL

To address the lack of an automated mechanism for
preserving evidence and maintaining integrity, a model was
developed targeting the various security and forensic
aspects during the investigation lifecycle. This model is an
improvement of the authors’ previous work [29]. The
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SecureRS model ties in with some of the readiness
processes addressed in ISO/IEC 27043 [14]. For instance,
the planning process group of ISO/IEC 27043 [14] involves
the “Planning pre-incident collection, storage, and handling
of data representing potential digital evidence” [14]. It
discusses the criteria of collection and storage, but nothing
is provided on how storage and evidence preservation
should be carried out. Therefore, the proposed model
consists of four high-level processes, namely data ingestion,
forensic soundness assurance, PDE storage, and forensic
soundness verification (see Figure 2).

multitude of data ingestion formats as well as a consistent
endpoint with a lower bandwidth than other API types.
When questioning the integrity of a storage engine or
system, it is important to understand what processes the
data undergoes. To ensure that the system or a user does not
modify any information, integrity checksums are calculated
before and after to ensure nothing was changed. Since the
collection of evidence does not fall within the scope of the
current research, it is assumed that data collected and sent
to the model is forensically sound already. The PDE storage
process is built for security, based on the CIA triad. During
the final stage – the verification process – the integrity
before and after storage is checked to ensure nothing has
been modified, thus ensuring forensic soundness. The four
processes followed in the model are discussed next in more
detail. The four phases are outlined, and how each aids the
security as well as forensic aspects that a piece of evidence
needs to possess for the evidence to be admissible in a court
of law.
A.

Figure 2. SecureRS Process Model

The data ingestion process acts as a mechanism for data to
be fed into the secure system. It ensures a controlled
environment because it is common practice to make use of
a Web API. The SecureRS model makes use of a
Representational State Transfer (REST) API to allow a

DATA INGESTION PROCESS

The data ingestion process comprises seven steps as seen
in Figure 2. This process starts with Potential Digital
Evidence (PDE) (i.e., small artefacts or pieces of data that
may have forensic value) and the PDE’s metadata, which
helps the system identify the origin and purpose of the
PDE. The collection of PDE is not considered part of the
scope of this research, as it is a vast research area on its
own and only the storage processes are explored in this
research. PDE metadata that is needed includes the user or
origin, IP address, computer name, rank, file name, and
hash checksum. This information is necessary, particularly
in an organization, to know where the PDE originates from
and to manage the data.
The next stage involves using a transport protocol so that
the data from the origin can be received by the system.
Different protocols are available; however, the most used
and common transport protocol, which is the foundation of
the internet, is TCP/IP. Using the TCP/IP method for data
transport makes it reliable for data ingestions. The transport
method also needs to be secured to prevent eavesdroppers
or man-in-the-middle attacks. The transport encryption
layer that is chosen involves making use of the secure
socket layer (SSL). This SSL layer, coupled with TCP/IP
together with HTTP and its application layer protocol,
provides HTTPS. An HTTPS connection provides a secure
means of communication that is encrypted between two
parties, namely the client and server. Using TLS (Transport
Layer Security)/SSL is an industry best practice and
standard as a move towards a more secure internet. If data
is intercepted (by a man-in-the-middle attack, for example),
it will be potentially unusable to an attacker as all data
would be encrypted [30]. In the SecureRS model, it was
decided to make use of a web REST API for data transfer
and logic processing. Web APIs are portable and the most
modular method of easily ingesting data, requiring minimal
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effort to set up. To make the ingestion process faster and
more standardized, a known standardized API endpoint
(similar to a URL path) is exposed on the webserver for
data to be ingested. Furthermore, allowing only the HTTP
POST method ensures that data remains secure and
encrypted in the body of the request. This method also
allows large files to be sent – as opposed to the HTTP GET
method. The data transferred in the POST method prevents
the webserver from logging the request information as what
can be seen from GET requests in server logs. Such
webserver logging could prove harmful as the GET request
parameters would be passed through the URL, which may
contain sensitive information. For simplicity, the data
format that is supported for ingestion is form data, as this
allows both textual information and file upload.
To ensure that only authorized parties can push data to
the storage engine, an API key and prefix key are generated
through a system admin account for each device/user within
the organization. The API key is hashed before it is stored,
therefore, the key is only displayed and available at the time
it is created. The API prefix furthermore serves as a unique
identifier. The API token is used in conjunction with the
prefix key to add another layer of security. The prefix key
and API key are then verified and, once successful, the
metadata is sanitized. This sanitization removes any
malicious data, SQL, or JS injections from cross-site
scripting (XSS) (from the metadata only). The PDE itself is
treated as a read-only file and not displayed in the system,
thereby removing the need to perform any sanitization, and
so ensuring the integrity of the PDE. The metadata
sanitization is performed to ensure that no exploits and
vulnerabilities are exposed by the system itself and to
conform to best web security practices. The metadata
collected about the PDE is shown in Figure 3, which is kept
separate from the PDE. After data has been sanitized to
ensure system security, the next process is data validation.

The validation process ensures that the data expected is the
data received and that the data is parsed with the correct
data structure and format. Once the data has been
successfully validated, it gets sent on to the next phase for
forensic assurance.
B.

C.

Figure 3. SecureRS http request example

FORENSIC SOUNDNESS ASSURANCE PROCESS

For digital evidence to be forensically sound and to be
held admissible in a court of law, its collection, storing, and
analysis must be documented in a legally acceptable
manner [16], [17], [31]. Therefore, assurance is needed to
prove that the evidence has not been corrupted or destroyed
during the investigation process, whether by accident or
intentionally. This process furthermore generates the
relevant information (such as hash checksums) to prove the
forensic soundness of the collected data once the data has
been received. Since this system is simply a storage engine,
it is assumed that the data that was collected before the
system ingestion was forensically sound. However, since
nothing has been written to disk or the database as yet, this
process is done in-memory. This is to ensure the data was
not modified while being written to the disk, whether by
another process or due to human error.
The ability to ensure forensic soundness is achieved by
taking an in-memory hash (H1) of the PDE using an MD5
hash algorithm as an integrity measure. It is then compared
to the metadata md5sum field received from the HTTP
POST request to ensure the data sent by the origin is indeed
what is received by the API. This serves a dual purpose,
namely, to ensure data was not lost or intercepted along the
way, and to maintain the integrity of the PDE. Although
MD5 is typically seen as an insecure hashing algorithm, it
is very suitable as an integrity measure due to its efficiency
in computing a hash as opposed to securing hashing
algorithms. The next step is to secure the PDE by
performing symmetric key encryption. This is to ensure that
data stored on the disk is not subject to being read by
another system or person, as a PDE file could contain
sensitive information. After PDE encryption, another hash
(H2) is generated of the encrypted PDE. This new hash is
used as input to the process of forensic soundness
verification. The next process involves the storage of the
encrypted PDE to disk.
PDE STORAGE PROCESS

The storage process starts by taking the encrypted PDE
from memory and generating a unique filename of 60
alpha-numeric characters to ensure that the system is
immune to URL manipulation. This unique filename
prevents a PDE from being easily identified by a system
admin since there would just be random encrypted files.
The PDE is stored to disk with read-only permissions on
the file system, such that no process or human error can
accidentally change it, thereby violating the PDE’s
integrity. After setting the permissions, the file is now
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safely stored in the secure storage within the protected
directory in the virtual environment, ready for verification
and integrity confirmation. Changing the extrinsic metadata
of the PDE (such as the file name or permissions) does not
change the data of the PDE itself, hence the hash and
integrity remain intact [18], [32]. Details of the forensic
verification and assurance process are presented next.
D.

FORENSIC SOUNDNESS VERIFICATION PROCESS

This process involves ensuring that the integrity of the
evidence is indeed intact and unaltered, thus adhering to
standard forensic practice. To ensure that the integrity of
the stored PDE remains intact, a hash (H3) is computed on
the stored and encrypted PDE. This adds a verification
layer which ensures that the forensic soundness of the PDE
is maintained from the point of encryption to the storage of
the PDE.
To ensure forensic soundness, the in-memory hash of the
encrypted PDE (H2) is then compared to (H3). If H2 and
H3 are the same, no deliberate or accidental manipulation
of the PDE occurred, and it is verified as forensically
sound. When the verification was successful, the entry is
inserted into the database for reference. This entry contains
the metadata of the PDE itself, such as the location of the
stored PDE, and not the actual PDE itself. Storing a
reference to a file location in a database – as opposed to
storing the entire file – conforms to best practices, due to
the inefficiency of storing binary data in a relational
database [19]. This also makes it difficult for an attacker as
it expands the attack vector by abstracting the PDE itself
from the metadata. For example, if an attacker gets
unauthorized access to the database, the only information
that can be extracted is the metadata which on its own does
not give enough information for malicious intent. To further
protect the entry in the database, the original hash and PDE
location are encrypted by the system, adding a layer of
security, and thereby making it impossible for an attacker
or system admin to relate PDE to its metadata outside the
system. If the hashes in the verification process are not
identical, it can be assumed that external modification could
have occurred or that something unconventional originated,
such as electricity spikes or bad disk sectors, thus resulting
in invalidating the forensic soundness. Such an instance
would be rare and uncontrolled, and a system admin would
be notified to manually investigate what the cause could
have been. This investigation is a manual process, as the
violation would have occurred under unknown
circumstances and was not part of the scope of this
research.
E.

PDE DOWNLOAD PROCESS

The downloading of PDE is also an important aspect of
the system to ensure that only authorized parties are
allowed to download the PDE. To protect the PDE, the

system first verifies the session of the logged-in user and
then prompts the user for the 2FA pin. Once the pin and the
session have been successfully validated, then only does the
system decrypt the PDE. Thereafter, another hash (H4) is
generated and then compared to the original hash (H1) to
ensure that nothing has happened to the PDE during storage
as well as to verify the integrity of the forensic copy that
will be downloaded by the investigator. In the event the
hashes do not match, the system will alert the administrator
to manually investigate the issue. Therefore, the
downloaded PDE that the investigator will receive is safe
and its integrity is maintained from ingestion into the
system to download, thereby minimizing any human error
that can occur as well as serving as a secure backup to PDE.
The hash is also given to the investigator if further
corroboration or verification is needed. The next section
discusses the reference implementation of the proposed
SecureRS model.
IV.

SecureRS TOOL

To show that the proposed SecureRS process model (see
Figure 2) would work and is valid, a proof-of-concept tool
was created using agile software development methodology
[33]. The requirement specification and usability are the
core functions for any software following agile principles.
To ensure that the proposed SecureRS proof-of-concept
tool adheres to standards and good software practice and
principles, the tool was tested using the testing processes of
the Computer Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) program [34]
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [35].
A.

SecureRS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
SPECIFICATION

The system requirements are divided into two categories,
namely secure storage core requirements (SS-CR) (see
Table 1) and secure storage optional requirements (SS-OR)
(see Table 2). For example, in Table 1 the label column
provides a reference number which will be used in Section
C. The description, on the other hand, provides the
requirements for the tool, for example, SS-CR-01 says that
the tool shall ingest data from an API endpoint, which
specifies the functionality of the tool.
Table 1. Secure Storage Core Requirements (SS-CR)

Label
SS-CR-01
SS-CR-02
SS-CR-03
SS-CR-04
SS-CR-05

Description
Data should be ingested through an API
endpoint
All activities performed within the tool
should be logged for auditability
Data should be able to be ingested
concurrently
Data storage should be consistent with data
received by the system
PDE data must be hashed for integrity
verification
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SS-CR-06
SS-CR-07
SS-CR-08
SS-CR-09

SS-CR-10
SS-CR-11
SS-CR-12
SS-CR-13
SS-CR-14

Metadata must be sanitized for security
purposes
PDE and sensitive metadata must be
encrypted using strong encryption
The hash digest and metadata should be
viewable by an investigator
The tool must provide digests of the
encrypted PDE to ensure its forensic
soundness
Each PDE should be distinguishable from
another anonymously
Ingested data collected should be displayed
Ingested data must be validated for
correctness
Authorization and authentication must be
implemented fully for access control
An investigator should be able to securely
download the PDE

Table 2. Secure Storage Optional Requirements (SS-OR)

Label
SS-OR-01
SS-OR-02
SS-OR-03
SS-OR-04
SS-OR-05

B.

Description
All metadata data should be encrypted for
anonymity
PDE can only be decrypted on a successful
session and 2FA validation
All stored PDE for specific user
permissions should be viewable
Malicious data should not be ingested and
stored as PDE
PDE should not be subject to URL
manipulation

SecureRS SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION

Now that the requirements have been defined, the tool
was implemented using a modular approach and applying
agile principles. The programming language that was
chosen to implement this tool was Python, due to its
flexibility and built-in frameworks and libraries. In order to
make a web platform and allow easy management, Django
web framework [36] was chosen. The tool uses Django
REST framework [37] as it provides a mechanism for
applying RESTful API functionality fairly easily. This
framework furthermore provides authentication based on a
secure API key, which is created from the admin panel on
the system, allowing easy management and revoking of
keys. Each key is unique and serves as an authentication
mechanism for making an HTTP POST request to the API
endpoint. The security sanitization process followed uses
Django’s default security middleware as well as custom
sanitization middleware to remove special characters and
tags from the metadata. The different middlewares used
include:
SecurityMiddleware,
SessionMiddleware,
CsrfViewMiddleware,
AuthenticationMiddleware,
XFrameOptionsMiddleware,
OTPMiddleware,
SessionSecurityMiddleware. The tool also made use of
encrypted fields in Django models to further protect the

sensitive metadata. This was done to prevent the misuse of
data due to unauthorized access or misconduct.
To secure the PDE file, a Django-encrypted file field
was chosen, which uses the Fernet encryption scheme [38].
The latter is a symmetric key algorithm that makes sure that
the encrypted message cannot be manipulated, brute-forced,
or read without a password key. This key is URL safe
encoded with base64 so that any reserved, unprintable, or
non-ASCII characters are replaced. It ensures that no errors
occur when handling the keys that an attacker could
potentially exploit. Fernet also makes use of advanced
encryption standard (AES) 128-bit cipher block chaining
(CBC) mode and public-key cryptographic standards
number 7 (PKCS7) padding. This means that the cipher is
in multiples of 128-bits, with PKCS7 padding to fill the
remaining bits. The password key makes use of a hashbased message authentication code (HMAC). The HMAC
serves a dual purpose and simultaneously verifies the
integrity and authenticity of a message. This is done to
ensure better security, as HMAC was used in conjunction
with a simple hashing algorithm (SHA) of 256 bits
(SHA256) [38]. All symmetric encryption keys are on the
system itself, either as a setting in the Django configuration
or managed by the Django framework itself.
Portability was one of the contributing factors for
making use of Docker [39] (a containerized approach to
hosting services). Using Docker makes the system easily
scalable as well as platform independent, and it provides
load balancing. The high-level flow chart showing the
lifecycle of SecureRS is shown in Figure 4. The lifecycle
starts with ensuring that the system is installed successfully,
and subsequently initializes the system. The setup does not
require much besides creating a superuser (a feature of the
Django framework) and it provides admin functionality
such as creating users, setting access roles, creating API
keys, etc.
Once the system has been initialized, the next step is
account creation, which involves two-factor authentication
(2FA), and the creation of API keys. From a design
perspective, it was decided that (for more security and
traceability) only an admin user can create users and API
keys. The 2FA system catered for email, SMS, and
YubiKey [40]. 2FA is required for logging in and also to
ensure safe download of a PDE file. Token generators make
use of the time-based one-time pin (TOTP) algorithm [41]
that generates 6-8 unique digits based on the current time
and some secret key that is added when the account is
registered. By design, these tokens are regenerated every 30
seconds to prevent attackers from brute-forcing the token or
launching phishing attacks. Backup tokens are also enabled
if devices used for TOTP are not available. These backup
tokens can only be used once, thereby allowing recovery
and security. User credentials are stored using Django's
default password field, which uses PBKDF2 with strong
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secure storage test cases (SS-TC) (see Table 4), and the
secure storage compliance matrix (SSCM) (see Table 5).
Table 3. Secure Storage Core Test Assertions (SS-CA)

Label
SS-CA-01

SS-CA-02

SS-CA-03

SS-CA-04

Description
All PDE files should be encrypted.
Justification: To preserve sensitive
information and confidentiality and to
prevent unauthorized access to the PDE.
Hash digests of the PDE should occur
before and after PDE encryption.
Justification: To maintain the integrity of
the PDE as well as to ensure no errors
occur or modifications are made to the
PDE itself.
Audit logging of all activity is
maintained.
Justification: This ensures that the chain
of custody is maintained and that the
process followed is reliable and
verifiable.
Metadata sanitization of ingested data.
Justification: To ensure good security
practices and prevent potential system
attacks. This reduces the attack vectors
from injection attacks like XSS, SQL
injection, and parsing attacks.

Table 4. Secure Storage Test Cases (SS-TC)
Figure 4. High-level Lifecycle of SecureRS

SHA 256-bit hashing and a random salt [36]. This password
stretching mechanism is recommended by NIST [35].
When an investigator selects a PDE file to be investigated
further, several checks occur. Firstly, the session is checked
to see if it is still active and if the logged-in user has the
required permissions. This is achieved by verifying that the
inactivity time of the user has not passed the threshold and
that 2FA is enabled. A user is warned after three minutes of
inactivity and consequently logged out after ten minutes of
inactivity. These thresholds are configurable in the settings.
After the session and 2FA process have been successfully
validated, the PDE will be decrypted by the system and
available for the investigator to download for further
manual investigation to corroborate findings. The
implementation of SecureRS platform can be found at:
https://github.com/AvinashSingh786/SecureRS

Label
SS-TC-01

SS-TC-02

SS-TC-03

SS-TC-04
SS-TC-05

SS-TC-06
SS-TC-07
SS-TC-08

C.

SECURE STORAGE VALIDATION

This section details the testing of the tool in terms of its
implementation correctness and determines if the tool has
met the requirements defined in Section A. This complies
with the NIST validation cycle and is structured as follows:
secure storage core test assertions (SS-CA) (see Table 3),

SS-TC-09
SS-TC-10

Description
Make a POST request with correct and
relevant data, to verify that the PDE and
metadata were successfully added.
Make a malicious POST request with
XSS and SQL injection payloads and
see if they are sanitized and averted.
Make a POST request with an incorrect
API token and check if the POST
request is denied.
Send multiple instances of invalid data
to test the validation process.
Manually hash the PDE before
encryption and test if the hash digests
match.
Download the PDE and see if it matches
the original database hash digest.
Verify the timestamp of the database
and the file timestamp.
Perform URL manipulation to attempt
to download PDE.
Try to download PDE without 2FA
authentication enabled.
Verify if 2FA works as expected.

A compliance matrix simply states the requirements, the
test case(s) that tested the specific requirement, and the
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result, which is a core test assertion or a manual check. For
example, if a core test assertion was met, that test assertion
is specified in the result column. However, if a manual
check was performed, it is indicated with '--check--',
indicating that the check result is compliant. The
compliance matrix determines if the tool met the
requirements and is compliant. The compliance matrix for
secure storage is presented in Table 5. The compliance
matrix confirms that the results from the test assertions
have been fulfilled, therefore implying that all the
requirements defined have been met and are successfully
tested and compliant.
Table 5. Secure Storage Compliance Matrix

#
1
2
3
4

Requirement
SS-CR-01
SS-CR-02
SS-CR-03
SS-CR-04

Test case
SS-TC-01
SS-TC-02
SS-TC-01
SS-TC-02, SS-TC08, SS-TC-04

5
6
7
8
9
10

SS-CR-05
SS-CR-06
SS-CR-07
SS-CR-08
SS-CR-09
SS-CR-10

11
12

SS-CR-11
SS-CR-12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

SS-CR-13
SS-CR-14
SS-OR-01
SS-OR-02
SS-OR-03
SS-OR-04
SS-OR-05

SS-TC-05
SS-TC-02
--check-SS-TC-01
SS-TC-02
SS-TC-05, SS-TC06
SS-TC-01
SS-TC-02, SS-TC03, SS-TC-07, SSTC-08
SS-TC-09
SS-TC-01
SS-TC-05
SS-TC-06
--check-SS-TC-03
SS-TC-08

Result
--check-SS-CA-01
--check-SS-CA-01,
SS-CA-02,
SS-CA-03,
SS-CA-04
SS-CA-02
SS-CA-04
--check-SS-CA-03
SS-CA-01
SS-CA-03, -check---check-SS-CA-03,
SS-CA-04
--check---check---check-SS-CA-03
--check-SS-CA-02
--check--

Now that the tool has been validated and satisfies the NIST
CFTT [34], the next phase is to evaluate the tool to
determine the performance of the system and its model.
V.

SecureRS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Given that the prototype system has been validated
through the NIST CFTT [34], it is important to gauge the
performance of the system. To determine the performance
of the system, several factors were considered – the speed
of data ingestion; the amount of data ingested; processor
and memory utilization; the time until the data was stored.
Table 6 shows the system specification that was used to
benchmark the application of SecureRS. Organizations
typically would run the system on the same network;

therefore, to rule out network speeds and latency, the
system was tested in ideal circumstances where the data
ingested was sourced from the same host, i.e., 'localhost'.
Table 6. Benchmarking System Specifications

Item
CPU
RAM
DISK
OS

Description
Intel Core i7
DDR4
NVME SSD
Windows 10

Specification
I7-7700HQ @ 2.8GHz
24 GB @ 2400MHz
1 TB @ Read: 3500
MB/s, Write: 3000 MB/s

It is also important to determine a baseline of the
SecureRS systems memory and processor utilization so that
when data is being ingested, the overall performance
difference can be determined. Table 7 shows the idle
baseline values for the system. From this table, an
approximate value of 36 MB of memory utilization and
about 1% of processor utilization are used, showing that
when no data is being ingested and stored, the system does
not utilize many resources.
Table 7. Baseline Processor and Memory Utilization of SecureRS

Item
Idle memory consumption
Idle processor utilization

Baseline values
~ 36 MB
~ 1%

The testing phase consisted of a 1 GB PDE and 100 MB
payload that contained methodically generated ASCII data.
In DFR, the size of a PDE is context-dependent and relies
on the kind of data that is stored. It is quite difficult to get
an accurate representation of the maximum size of a PDE
payload. However, this research is aimed at DFR, so large
PDE files would be extremely rare. To that end, tests were
performed on the perceived worst-case and best-case size of
a PDE to determine the effects on performance. For this
study, the worst case chosen was a large payload of 1 GB
and the average case was 100 MB. These values were
chosen based on some existing DFR literature [42]–[45]. To
make the performance evaluation as comprehensive as
possible, the system was tested under various
circumstances, namely single, multiple, and concurrent
HTTP requests. In the case of single requests, only one
HTTP POST request was made, and the performance
indicators were observed. Multiple HTTP requests were
sent synchronously, meaning that after one request was
sent, another was initiated. To get an average, a set of 10
requests was made. The reason for testing synchronously
was to determine the implications of the hashing process
conducted by the system and to see if it would be able to
handle the load without using many resources. The final
evaluation was based on sending concurrent requests to the
system to see how its performance would be affected and to
show the robustness of the system. Table 8 shows the
performance of a single request with a 1 GB PDE payload.
The results in parentheses show the performance at the time
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of hashing and encryption. From these results, an average
of 3.6% processor utilization was used while 19.6% was
used during hashing and encryption. We observed a higher
memory utilization during hashing and encryption,
apparently because parts of the file must be read into
memory before it can be encrypted and hashed. Overall, for
the worst case of a 1 GB PDE, a total time of 36.76s was
observed to ingest, validate, secure, and store. Where an
investigator would perform the process manually, it would
take roughly 2m 11s, based on one manual attempt
conducted by the authors.
When comparing Table 8 and Table 9, there is not much
difference in the performance. This was expected since the
requests were sent synchronously. An average time of
36.21s was observed from the time the PDE was sent to the
storage engine until the time it was successfully stored
following the forensic assurance processes. Table 10 shows
the performance for concurrent requests, and a slight
decrease in ingestion speed and an increase in CPU usage
could be observed. This was expected, as requests were
performed in parallel.
Table 8. Performance of 1 GB PDE with Single Request

Item (1 GB PDE)
Speed of data ingestion
Amount of data ingested
Processor utilization
Memory utilization
Time

Single request
(during encryption)
102 MB/s
1.33 GB
3.6% (19.6%)
30.2 MB (4.3 GB)
36.76s (16.3s)

Table 9. Performance of 1GB PDE with Multiple Requests

Item (1 GB PDE)
Average speed of data
ingestion
Total amount of data
ingested
Average. processor
utilization
Average memory
utilization
Average time per request

Multiple single requests
{10} (during encryption)
110 MB/s
14.6 GB
3.4% (16.2%)
36.6 MB (5.2 GB)
36.21s (18.9s)

Table 10. Performance of 1GB PDE with Concurrent Requests

Item (1 GB PDE)

Average speed of data
ingestion
Total amount of data
ingested
Average processor
utilization
Average memory utilization
Total average time

Concurrent request
{10} (during
encryption)
108 MB/s

Table 11 to Table 13 show that where a smaller PDE
was used, a corresponding insignificant difference in
performance was observed. This implies that the system can
still perform well under high load without a significant time
utilization; however, as expected, it does consume more
resources. The bottleneck occurs when hashing and
encryption are performed, since this is a computationally
expensive task. Even though during the concurrent requests
there was more processor and memory utilization, the
system still performed well given the process each PDE had
to undergo. Results from Table 8 to Table 13 clearly show
that SecureRS can still ingest data relatively well and is
able to handle the load without much resource usage.
Moreover, forensic soundness is ensured through the
defined processes.
Table 11. Performance of 100 MB PDE with Single Request

Item (100 MB PDE)
Speed of data ingestion
Amount of data ingested
Processor utilization
Memory utilization
Time

Single request
(during encryption)
40.3 MB/s
133 MB
1.6% (10.6%)
30.2 MB (144 MB)
5.02 (4.4s)

Table 12. Performance of 100 MB PDE with Multiple Requests

Item (100 MB PDE)
Average speed of data
ingestion
Total amount of data
ingested
Average processor
utilization
Average memory
utilization
Average time per request

Multiple single requests
{10} (during encryption)
50.1 MB/s
1.33 GB
4.4% (13.2%)
43.6 MB (117 MB)
7.21s (6.1s)

Table 13. Performance of 100 MB PDE with Concurrent Requests

Item (100 MB PDE)
Average speed of data
ingestion
Total amount of data
ingested
Average processor
utilization
Average memory
utilization
Total average time

Concurrent request {10}
(during encryption)
99 MB/s
1.3 GB
14.4% (43.5%)
43.5 MB (2.1 GB)
11.3s (3.4s)

13.3 GB
16.4% (46.5%)
33.5 MB (6.6 GB)
1m 34s (22.3s)

To further illustrate the effectiveness of SecureRS, a
graphical depiction of Table 8 to 13 is illustrated in Figure
5. From this figure, the observed speed of data ingestion
remained relatively consistent with relation to the PDE size
and operation. The memory consumption remained
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somewhat consistent over the tests excluding the encryption
state. The concurrent processor utilization for both the 1GB
and 100MB PDE remained in a same range between 1416% whereas the time was significantly better with the
larger PDE. This is on the assumption that 1GB test is 10
times that of the 100MB test. This therefore suggests that if
the 100MB concurrent test took 11.3s, the 1GB one would
be estimated around 113s, and the actual value was 94s.
This therefore demonstrates the efficacy of the SecureRS
system. A similar deduction can be made when looking at
the speed of data ingestion for the concurrent tests factoring
in the network limitations.

Figure 5. Comparison of performance tests

A test was conducted utilizing a larger PDE of 10 GB
and the overall time taken was 2m 24s. The average CPU
was 12%, with the total amount of data stored being
13.3 GB. Although this system was developed with small
artifacts in mind, it can cater for file sizes as large as the
system’s memory, due to the limitations of the Fernet
encryption python library. This limitation can easily be
addressed by file-streaming the information instead;
however, this falls outside of the scope of DFR and the
research at hand. The next section discusses what the
proposed model achieved and how this can aid the forensic
investigation lifecycle.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CASE SCENARIO

In traditional digital forensic processes, investigators
are often expected to follow the correct procedure and
protocol. However, human error can occur. For example,
several litigation proceedings have resulted in exculpatory

outcomes due to digital evidence mishandling [46], [47].
However, automating and providing a storage engine with
forensics and security in place, significantly aids an
investigator. For instance, the investigator does not need to
be concerned about safely securing artefacts or data that
contains sensitive information. Furthermore, the threat of
privacy concerns and integrity violation, which has been
associated with poor digital evidence handling, can be
reduced when human elements are restricted. Therefore, the
forensic storage process developed in this study can be
defined as the potential steps towards addressing these
challenges. This system works well for digital forensic
readiness whereby potential digital evidence is collected on
the fly.
A case scenario of the use of the SecureRS model is to be
a plugin into a collection model. For example, the previous
work by the authors involved the collection of forensic
artefacts from a ransomware attack using digital forensic
readiness [48]. Such previous work involved collecting
small-sized PDE files and storing them for further
investigation. While the collection on its own is a major
contribution, the authors did not ensure the extra measures
to protect the PDE and ensure that it was forensically sound
and admissible in a court of law. The SecureRS model
solves this problem and helps other research within DFR to
the extent that developed frameworks or systems do not
need to be concerned about the storage and preservation of
the potential digital evidence collected. However,
integrating this peculiar notion of secure storage for digital
investigation was quoted as potential future research.
SecureRS can aid in ensuring the integrity of the collected
PDE. Furthermore, the model developed in [43] asserts that
the use of security standards like encryption and hashing
can be used to achieve confidentiality and integrity. Based
on the performance evaluation, the model developed in [43]
has a low impact on a system whilst providing a core and
essential service. Extending this previous study, SecureRS
provides a feasibility and proof-of-concept implementation
of automated evidence storage. By integrating a reliable
forensic process and practice, SecureRS provides a
platform for developing a limited human interaction with
potential digital evidence.

VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS

To further evaluate the developed SecureRS tool and
model, a threat modelling and security analysis process was
followed (see Table 14). In this model, several security
features were used to protect and maintain the integrity and
forensic soundness of the data stored. This was achieved by
using the CIA triad and several security requirements. For
instance, threats due to filename change or deletion was
addressed in SecureRS using randomization of file name,
and permission-based access control such that only
permitted action (by the authorized entity) is allowed.
Furthermore, the log of such an action is provided for each
instance. This further addressed the need for accountability
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(system audit process) within the system. The SecureRS
thus provide a forensic platform that can mitigate such a
threat. Similarly, to ensure confidentiality and prevent the
potential of sensitive information leakage, SecureRS
leverages an encryption algorithm with stronger immunity.
Table 14. Threat-Solution model using the CIA triad

Threat
Access to
sensitive
information

Solution
Implementing
encryption
(Confidentiality
and Authorization)

Method
Fernet encryption

Attacker
changes
filenames or
deleting files

Random file
names and readonly permissions

Attacker
changes
contents of
PDE data in
memory

Applying
permissions
(Integrity,
Availability, and
Authorization)
Implementing
hashing
(Confidentiality,
Integrity, and
Authorization)

Attacker
finds
credentials
and can login

Implementing 2FA
(Confidentiality,
Authenticity, and
Authorization)

Attacker
gains
physical
access to a
computer
after
investigator
goes outside
XSS and
injection
attacks

Implementing
session timeouts
(Confidentiality,
Availability, and
Authenticity)

Customizable
activity and
session timers are
used to prevent
unauthorized
access

Implementing data
sanitization
(Confidentiality,
Integrity, and
Availability)
Implementing logs
(Confidentiality
and
Nonrepudiation)
Implementing
HTTPS and API
Keys
(Confidentiality,
Integrity,
Authenticity, and
Nonrepudiation)

Django
middleware and
HSTS + secure
cookies

Investigator
denying PDE
download
Interception
of PDE in
transit

MD5 hashing is
used to compare
source MD5 of the
PDE file and
received PDE file.
Also, OS memory
protection is used
TOTP is used for
PDE downloading

VIII.

IX.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this paper developed a model and a
platform to secure Potential Digital Evidence (PDE) and to
ensure the forensic soundness of the stored PDE. The
platform was evaluated and shown to render good
performance, despite having to go through all the forensic
processes defined by the proposed model (SecureRS).
Having a process in place to secure evidence can help
prevent unauthorized access and comply with regulations
and privacy policies, due to the nature of the data being
stored. Having this model in place also helps to verify and
validate the stored PDE and make it admissible in a court of
law. By leveraging encryption and hashing, the SecureRS
model makes good use of current security standards and
therefore will aid forensic investigation in general. The
model also helps to detect evidence tampering. This paper
suggests a method of ensuring forensically sound digital
evidence for DFR as well as for digital forensics processes
in general. So far, this aspect of forensics investigation has
been widely overlooked and it was often considered to be
the sole responsibility of the forensic investigator. The
focus and scope of this study involved smaller artefacts for
performance evaluation. With SecureRS an investigator
does not need to be concerned about verification and
authenticity of evidence when performing a digital
investigation. The SecureRS platform furthermore acts as a
backup of evidence that is securely and safely stored.
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